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Deconstructing the Financialization of Healthcare
Benjamin M. Hunter and Susan F. Murray
ABSTRACT
Financialization is promoted by alliances of multilateral ‘development’ or-
ganizations, national governments and owners and institutions of private
capital. In the healthcare sector, the leveraging of private sources of finance
is widely argued as necessary to achieve the Sustainable Development Goal 3
target of universal health coverage. Employing social science perspectives on
financialization, the authors of this article contend that this is a new phase of
capital formation. The article traces the antecedents, institutions, instruments
and ideas that facilitated the penetration of private capital in this sector, and
the emergence of new asset classes that distinguish it. The authors argue
that this deepening of financialization represents a fundamental shift in the
organizing principles for healthcare systems, with negative implications for
health and equality.
INTRODUCTION
The contemporary landscape of development is marked by growing roles for
private sources of finance. These are often justified as a necessary strategy to
fill the estimated annual gap of US$ 2.5 trillion required to achieve the Sus-
tainable Development Goals (SDGs) globally — gaps considered beyond
the capability of public financing (World Bank and IMF, 2015). The quest to
improve human well-being is now being re-framed around the notion of ‘un-
locking the transformative potential’ of the private sector, and bilateral and
multilateral organizations are increasingly expected to devote public funds
to support that process (United Nations, 2015). But beyond the hyperbole
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of ‘innovation’ and ‘leverage’, ‘disruption’ and ‘partnerships’, what are the
structural features that enable this shift in roles and responsibilities? What
institutions and instruments are facilitating it, and what do we know of its
consequences?
In this article we explore such questions through an examination of cur-
rent trends in the financing and organization of healthcare that situates these
trends within a trajectory of capital formation — specifically, the active
attempts by state and non-state actors to accelerate and deepen financializa-
tion, creating newmarkets and opportunities for accumulation in the name of
‘development’ (Mawdsley et al., 2018). Health of populations is considered
a prerequisite for sustainable development, and US$ 371 billion annually is
estimated as necessary to achieve targets for SDG 3 alone, to ‘ensure healthy
lives and promote well-being’ (Stenberg et al., 2017). While the aspirations
set out in the targets for Goal 3 require many promotion and prevention
actions in spheres well beyond healthcare, it is healthcare industries that
are experiencing considerable growth (Deloitte, 2019) as global per capita
spending on health is expected to increase 50 per cent by 2030, with much of
the growth concentrated in middle-income countries (Dieleman et al., 2017).
It is within this scenario, and amidst a slowing in the growth of develop-
ment assistance for health (ibid.), that we are seeing a shift towards using
public funds to facilitate private investment in healthcare companies through
equity investments and loans. Before 2006, just US$ 0.4 bn was commit-
ted by bilateral and multilateral development finance institutions to private
healthcare providers in the form of equity investments and loans. This rose to
US$ 1.9 bn for the period 2007 to 2015. Almost as much again (an estimated
US$ 1.7 bn) was committed over 2016 and 2017 alone (Hunter andMarriott,
2018).
We will argue that an examination of the interaction between healthcare
and a financialization–development nexus helps us to distinguish the dis-
tinctive nature of the latest emerging phase of health system change — that
of the transformation of healthcare into saleable and tradeable assets for
global investors. For our analysis we draw on policy documents, annual re-
ports, online databases and media sources obtained through a ‘snowballing’
approach, via searches of organization websites and internet searches us-
ing Google. The internet searches used as keywords the names of specific
investors and investment projects which were identified from organization
websites and from results of initial online searches that combined ‘health’
with terms such as ‘development financing’, ‘innovative financing’, ‘private
capital’, ‘equity investment’, ‘private finance initiative’ and ‘impact bond’.
We identify historical antecedents in the commercialization of healthcare
provision, sketch out organizations and instruments that are facilitating the
entry of private capital into healthcare, and consider the promotional appa-
ratus used by private capital and how it sits within a particular, functionalist,
interpretation of the ambition of universal health coverage. We question the
emergent discourse that private investment is the preferred and necessary
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route to improve health, and highlight population health and equity con-
cerns. The article concludes with a reflection on potential sites of critique
and resistance towards financialization, and areas for further study.
FINANCIALIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT
Financialization in its broadest sense is the ‘increasing role of financial
motives, financial markets, financial actors and financial institutions in the
operation of the domestic and international economies’ (Epstein, 2005: 3).
Financialization creates new patterns of capital accumulation (Fine, 2012;
Krippner, 2005) and shapes social institutions and subjectivities (Davis and
Kim, 2015; van der Zwan, 2014), leading to new forms of social regulation
(Storm, 2018), and resistance (Davis and Kim, 2015).
The financialization–development nexus has come under scrutiny by crit-
ical social science researchers in the last few years (Mawdsley, 2018). They
have pointed to a dissociation of financial returns from the productive econ-
omy (Fine, 2012), the cannibalization of the latter to serve the interests of
finance (Storm, 2018), and the elevation of shareholder concerns over and
above other issues such as social impact.Work on the financialization of food
production associated with land grabbing (Brooks, 2016; Clapp and Isakson,
2018) shows how, in linking the productive economy to the ebbs and flows
of finance capital, basic needs like food are subjected to instability while
entire sectors and regions are subordinated to the needs of financial markets.
Commercially motivated actors may symbolically construct these sectors
and regions as sites for investment (Fourcade, 2013; Mawdsley, 2018), but
this discourse obfuscates the underlying dependency relationships, imperi-
alism and geographically uneven development that are reproduced through
investment and value-creation processes (Bortz and Kaltenbrunner, 2018;
Pike and Pollard, 2009; Rankin, 2013).
Financialization is enacted through technologies that both individualize
and collateralize new areas of life. This is demonstrated powerfully by the
ways in which a global push towards ‘financial inclusion’ has manifested
in the rapid expansion of credit and other financial services (Mader, 2018).
Loan-based technologies such as microfinance have opened up new op-
portunities for rent seeking from the poor (Mader, 2014) while promoting
indebtedness through individualized, racialized and gendered representa-
tions of entrepreneurship in the global South (Rankin, 2013; Soederberg,
2013). The individualized risks for engagement with finance can then be
bundled together as asset-backed securities for trading in global financial
markets (Lavinas, 2018).
As observed by Fine (2012), it is not merely the expansion and prolifer-
ation of financial markets over the last 30 years that has been so striking
but also the penetration of such financing into widening areas of social re-
production including housing, pensions and health. A recent Development
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and Change Forum Debate on financialization (introduced by Storm, 2018)
explored a number of important aspects of this penetration and its conse-
quences in social protection and personal finance. We aim to add to this with
a close analysis of the healthcare sector.
Most of the considerable ‘global health’ literature to date has been uncrit-
ical, but a small body of work expresses concerns about volatility, amorality
and opacity of private investment into global health (Stein and Sridhar,
2018), including health-related bonds issued by the International Finance
Facility for Immunisation launched by Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance (Mitchell
and Sparke, 2016) and the World Bank’s Pandemic Emergency Facility
(Erikson, 2015b). Erikson’s (2015a) analysis of the Bill and Melinda Gates
Foundation’s Global Health Investment Fund for pharmaceuticals is an im-
portant example of investment fund scrutiny. These critical scholars point
to a neglect of structural drivers for poor health — the limitations and in-
equities of existing health systems and global pharmaceutical markets and
intellectual property regimes— and the bypassing of domestic governments
and regulatory regimes for pharmaceuticals (Erikson, 2015b). Relatively
little research has been done so far on the practicalities of financialization
in healthcare provision. Two exceptions, Bayliss (2016) and Eren Vural
(2017), have analysed processes, actors and sectoral effects in England and
Turkey, respectively, demonstrating the value of detailed national analysis.
They show deepening inequities, spiralling costs and market concentration.
Here we situate those analyses within global trends for capital formation,
highlighting the intersections with development finance.
THE GROUNDWORK OF COMMERCIALIZATION IN HEALTHCARE
The justification for promoting private investment in social sectors has been
fuelled by gaps in adequate resourcing of unified public systems. Healthcare
is no exception. A lack of comprehensive healthcare infrastructure and inade-
quate numbers of healthcare workers mean that physical access to healthcare
has been inadequate in many countries and that technical quality has often
been poor (Evans and Pablos-Me´ndez, 2016).
The expansion of private financial capital in the healthcare sector was
also made possible by proactive policies for commercialization. Prior to the
1993 intervention by the World Bank report, Investing in Health (World
Bank, 1993), healthcare in many settings was delivered by a mix of gov-
ernment providers, a non-governmental not-for-profit (often faith-based)
sector, independent private practitioners and informal solo or family-based
practitioners. There were relatively few commercial opportunities for larger
formal for-profit organizations until reforms placed an ever-growing empha-
sis on market creation and cash income (Mackintosh and Koivusalo, 2005).
The early stages of the process were marked by moratoria on the expansion
of public healthcare provision, the contracting out of ancillary services in
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public hospitals, and the introduction of user-fee systems. Fees for health-
care became institutionalized and contributed to households’ descent into,
and reproduction of, poverty (Krishna, 2010; McIntyre et al., 2006; Storeng
et al., 2010), as well as human rights abuses such as forced detention in
hospital for non-payment of bills (Yates et al., 2017).
At the time that Investing in Health was published the reach of formal,
for-profit health service provision had typically been limited to high-income
groups (Bloom et al., 2013), but within a decade the presence of private
capital had expanded across global health governance, financing and provi-
sion (O’Laughlin, 2016), under the rubric of ‘public–private partnerships’
(Richter, 2004), allowing access to many new loci for profit making. The
Millennium Development Goal era became characterized by public–private
partnerships across the health sector, encompassing corporate involvement
in global public decision making as part of corporate responsibility initia-
tives, and the contracting of private organizations to deliver public services
(Richter, 2004). For more than a decade the partnership euphemism was
employed to legitimize private profit in sectors that have substantial govern-
ment presence (Richter, 2004; Standing, 2010), and to invite transnational
capital to influence global public policies (Richter, 2003).
As recent work in this journal has demonstrated, a phase of corporate-
oriented healthcare reforms transformed healthcare systems into profitable
zones for global capital (Bayliss, 2016; O’Laughlin, 2016; Qadeer and Baru,
2016). For three decades the ‘common sense’ prevalent amongst much of
the global health and development communities was that healthcare com-
mercialization and the application of business methods were both inevitable
and more efficient (Mackintosh and Koivusalo, 2005). Within healthcare
organizations this perception was supported by the expansion of manage-
rial and finance expertise (Mulligan, 2016). The latest phase has extended
these assumptions to include the greater use of private financial capital to
expand healthcare infrastructure. Indeed, loans with interest for this type
of activity are being portrayed as morally superior to development aid
‘handouts’ on the grounds that the latter address symptoms but not drivers
of poverty (House of Commons International Development Committee,
2015).
Private healthcare investments — by development finance institutions
and others — have so far predominantly been made in large middle-income
countries where the state has liberalized its regimes to allow private activity.
Private healthcare companies burgeoned in India, for example, after the
federal government lifted national restrictions on foreign direct investment
in hospitals in 2000, while the loosening of restrictions on foreign ownership
of hospitals in China during the 12th and 13th five-year plan periods offered
similar in-roads. In Turkey, a Health Transformation Plan launched in 2003
introduced a purchaser–provider split andmechanisms for public contracting
of private providers, enabling that sector to grow and consolidate (Eren
Vural, 2017; Yilmaz, 2017).
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‘PARTNERSHIP CAPITAL’ AND THE INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
FOR HEALTHCARE FINANCIALIZATION
The new patterns of capital accumulation are situated in institutional trajecto-
ries that have permitted, and delivered, ever-deepening penetration of private
finance. This is not particular to healthcare. Ouma (2016) makes a similar
case in highlighting the policies and practices that permit and legitimize
agri-finance capital formation, and its limited expansion beyond regions that
have well-established agriculture markets. The relationship between devel-
opment aid and financialization is important to an understanding of these
contemporary changes as aid is used to transform new sectors and regions
into investor-friendly asset classes and to de-risk opportunities for private
investment in those asset classes; an approach that sees private enterprise
as the primary means to achieve economic growth (Mawdsley et al., 2018).
Development organizations provide technical assistance for the creation of
private investment projects such as private finance initiatives (Bayliss and
Van Waeyenberge, 2017), and offer co-investments, loans and guarantees
to de-risk investments. Development-themed bonds are perhaps the most
significant emerging mechanism for using aid to draw in private invest-
ment, with new modalities including catastrophe bonds (Johnson, 2013) and
impact bonds (Mawdsley, 2018).
The World Bank’s private equity investment arm, the International Fi-
nance Corporation (IFC), occupies a central role in this process, much as
the World Bank has led the private turn in development financing generally.
Between 1998 and 2013 the IFC committed US$ 1.9 bn in the health sector,
including commitments for diagnostic chains, health insurers, information
technology and medical education (IFC, 2013b). Its health and education
commitments (grouped together in IFC annual reports as ‘consumer and
social services’) increased from 2 per cent of its overall investment port-
folio in 2007, to 8 per cent in 2015 (IFC, 2007, 2016). The IFC’s reports
‘Business of Health in Africa’ (2008) and ‘Landscape of Inclusive Busi-
ness Models of Healthcare in India’ (2014) championed private financing
to expand corporate healthcare chains, and the organization has facilitated
private finance initiatives for healthcare infrastructure (IFC, 2013a). Com-
panies in receipt of IFC investments had 142 million healthcare users by
2017, and the IFC aims to increase this eight-fold by 2030 (IFC, 2017c). A
recent article by a principal equity specialist at the IFC noted health to be
one of its best performing sectors in terms of returns on investment (Mirza,
2018).
Other multilateral development banks havemade investments on a smaller
scale, as have government-owned institutions. The former include the Eu-
ropean Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), European In-
vestment Bank and African Development Bank, while the latter include
US Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), France’s Socie´te´ de
Promotion et de Participation pour la Coope´ration Economique (Proparco),
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Germany’s Deutsche Investitions- und Entwicklungsgesellschaft (DEG) and
UK’s CDC Group.1
The investments in healthcare companies made by development finance
institutions can be understood as part of their extended role to ‘escort’
private finance into development (Carroll and Jarvis, 2014). While promot-
ing private capital flows as part of development aid activities is not new,
it has become much more central in the era of the SDGs (Van Waeyen-
berge, 2015). The 2015 Addis Ababa Agenda on financing for development,
for example, emphasized the need to use public funds to support and ex-
pand privately financed and owned infrastructure (United Nations, 2015).
Others have preferred to refer to this process as a ‘leveraging’ of the pri-
vate sector (World Bank and IMF, 2015) or a ‘catalysis’ process (IFC,
2016).
Public and private actors of various stripes have pushed for these moves,
creating alliances of multinational organizations, national governments and
owners of private capital, operating as a single epistemic community (Yil-
maz, 2017). Lefebvre (2010) points to the collaborative efforts to deregulate
healthcare investment in India that brought together the World Bank, na-
tional and state governments, domestic banks and industry representatives,
including the Confederation of Indian Industries and the physician-owners of
hospital chains themselves. In Turkey, the Justice and Development Party’s
Health Transformation Programme, supported by the World Bank, appealed
simultaneously to the urban poor and private hospital owners by expanding
public health insurance to allow purchasing of services from private health-
care providers (Yilmaz, 2017). In so doing it stimulated rapid expansion
in investment and capacity in private healthcare provision, and subsequent
market concentration (Eren Vural, 2017). More recently, the national gov-
ernment’s programme to construct 25 ‘health campuses’ using private fi-
nance initiatives (lenders include EBRD, IFC, OPIC and a suite of private
organizations) speaks less to the commercial interests of private healthcare
providers and more to those of investment, real estate, construction and
medical technology industries.
Another alliance, the steering committee for the IFC’s ‘Business of Health
in Africa’ report, comprised the Gates Foundation, a former Minister of
Health in Nigeria and the founder of South Africa-based healthcare multi-
national, Netcare. The Gates Foundation is a private actor with considerable
global influence that is frequently to be found supporting such initiatives; it
part-funded the IFC report, has made equity investments in Africa Health
SystemsManagement’s Investment Fund for Health in Africa, supported ex-
pansion of corporate-led development (McGoey, 2012), and has taken a lead
role in the Global Health Investment Fund (Erikson, 2015a). Netcare is lead
1. CDC Group was originally named the Colonial Development Corporation, which was then
changed to the Commonwealth Development Corporation. The organization is now known
simply as CDC Group.
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partner for a consortium awarded an IFC-brokered private finance initiative
contract with the Lesotho government for the construction and management
of the QueenMamohato Memorial Hospital; the project attracted worldwide
attention for locking the government into a contract with high costs (Oxfam,
2014).
The emergence of wealthy owners of capital looking to expand their in-
fluence as ‘development partners’ is revealing of the opportunities afforded
by development financing. Abraaj Capital was briefly a leading fund man-
ager and investor in middle-income country healthcare sectors (Hunter and
Marriott, 2018) before foundering on allegations of misuse over its US$ 1
bn Growth Markets Health Fund (Clark et al., 2018). Abraaj’s founder, Arif
Naqvi, had claimed status as a ‘thought leader’ by championing the concept
of ‘partnership capital’ — in the form of public and multilateral loan guar-
antees and risk mitigation for equity companies — as a solution for many of
the world’s problems including climate change and droughts (Naqvi, 2016).
Such claims seem at odds with Abraaj’s investments in oil companies such
as Kuwait Energy, Byco and PetroTiger, but nonetheless Navqi joined the
United Nations Global Compact as a Board Member. Parts of Abraaj’s
Growth Markets Health Fund portfolio appear set to be assimilated by TPG
Capital’s Rise Fund (Kalesh and Shah, 2018), founded in 2016 by a group
of global business leaders, led by TPG’s Bill McGlashan, along with former
President of eBay Jeff Skoll, and rock star venture capitalist Bono. In a sign
of deepening ties between these private investors and development organiza-
tions, IFC andCDCGroup recently joinedwith theRise Fund to launch an In-
vestors forHealth initiative promoting private investment in the health sector.
The association of development financingwith profit reflects a longer trend
of reciprocal benefits in the aid sector that is reflected in the institutions
of bilateral/multilateral aid (Sogge, 2002), corporate social responsibility
(Herrick, 2009) and philanthropy (McGoey, 2012). What seems to have
changed in the current iteration is the acceptance of an argument that private
profit and self-interest are somehow necessary for development (McGoey,
2012). Navqi’s ‘partnership capital’ reflected this shift towards overt profit
making for ostensibly philanthropic work.
NEW ASSET CLASSES FOR HEALTHCARE FINANCIALIZATION
‘Investing in health’ means creating opportunities for profitable investments
in the health sector (Qadeer and Baru, 2016). Privately financed projects
in the healthcare sector to date have sought to expand existing health-
care facilities or construct new ones, and the facilities either pass to pub-
lic ownership as in ‘private finance initiatives’, possibly with contracted
private sector management, or remain in private ownership. Healthcare fi-
nancialization represents a new phase of capital formation that builds on,
but is distinct from, previous rounds of privatization and neoliberal health-
Deconstructing the Financialization of Healthcare 1271
care reform and this is manifested in the creation of new asset classes.
In this section we highlight three instruments that perform this ‘mundane
work’ of financialization (Mawdsley, 2018), transforming population ill-
health into zones for investment and creating saleable commodities that
can be traded by domestic and transnational private capital: private health-
care companies, private finance initiatives for healthcare infrastructure, and
impact bonds.
Privately owned chains of hospitals and clinics receive loans and invest-
ments to serve their expansion within middle-income countries or relatively
wealthy enclaves in low-income countries. They generally follow one of
two business models. The first model is characterized by high user fees and
aims to support high-end healthcare consumption by aspiring and wealthier
segments of the domestic and global population, and to feed into develop-
ment of a private insurance market. The second focuses on the ‘bottom of
the pyramid’; a concept that emerged in the business world during the 2000s
as a model for generating revenue by selling products and services to poorer
groups in society (Prahalad, 2004). In healthcare, ‘bottom of the pyramid’
models are based on Fordist high-throughput approaches that minimize costs
and maximize economies of scale (IFC, 2013c), and that look to a future
of government subsidies to cover costed packages of basic care for poorer
groups that cannot afford their fees.
Private finance initiatives have been used to backload the construction
costs for public healthcare facilities in the global North since the 1990s
(McKee et al., 2006), and are introduced on the premise that they provide
vital healthcare infrastructure and may in some cases offer predictability in
payments (Hellowell, 2016). The high overall costs of these arrangements
compared to government borrowing has led to increasing criticism within
and beyond the healthcare sector in those settings, as discussed below;
however, a global South revival of the private finance initiative model is
being championed by the IFC (Bayliss and Van Waeyenberge, 2017).
Impact bonds are a nascent asset class in the healthcare sector, with in-
vestors providing up-front financing that is returned by outcome funders
(usually governmental and philanthropic organizations) based on perfor-
mance. Examples from low- and middle-income countries include projects
to build International Committee of the Red Cross centres for physical
rehabilitation in Congo, Mali and Nigeria, and a quality improvement pro-
gramme for maternity services in private hospitals in India (Social Finance,
2018). A recently announced Cameroon Cataract Performance Bond at-
tracted US$ 2 m for the construction of a high-throughput eye care facility
in Cameroon, although negotiations to convince OPIC to become the lead
investor led to a bond agreement that appears to absolve OPIC of almost
any financial risk as the entire investment principal will be returned, plus
4 per cent interest, even in the event of project implementers not meeting
targets, with an interest rate of 8 per cent if targets are met (Oroxom et al.,
2018).
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Investment platforms and fund managers occupy a central role in the
development of healthcare asset classes. They enable investors to pool re-
sources and spread risk, transform fixed infrastructure into investor-friendly
assets and mediate relationships across regulatory regimes (Searle, 2018).
Alliances of state and non-state actors including the IFC and Gates Foun-
dation have been pivotal in developing intermediary investment funds,
for example those focused on health sectors in African countries (Mar-
riott and Hamer, 2014), and follow on from more than a decade of
‘emerging market’ investment funds that occupy practical and performa-
tive roles in financialization (Fourcade, 2013). The use of intermediary
funds, many of which are registered in tax havens such as Mauritius
and the Cayman Islands, provides additional opportunities for rent ex-
traction by companies that manage and audit the funds and associated le-
gal work, with little transparency and accountability (Hunter and Marriott,
2018).
The framing of healthcare infrastructure as an asset class reflects wider
attempts to find commercial value in social sectors. Infrastructure projects are
structured into packages with the most lucrative offered to private investors
and for global trading. Smaller projects may be bundled together to attract
larger commercial investors which, as Bayliss and VanWaeyenberge (2017)
note, is driving a standardization of private finance initiative processes,
regardless of the sector involved and implications for service provision.
There are similar hopes amongst industry representatives that impact bonds
will eventually be traded in bondmarkets but, asMawdsley (2018) notes, the
complexity and cost of their novel commodification system has hampered
more widespread use.Meanwhile the expansion of universal health coverage
insurance schemes provides mechanisms for public subsidy of private profit-
seeking activity and functions as a state-backed security for rent extraction
by finance capital, akin to that offered by conditional cash transfers (Lavinas,
2018). Whereas personal credit is secured by social protection policies such
as cash transfers that ensure a regular stream of income, hospital debt is
secured using state-backed health insurance that ensures steady streams of
healthcare users and revenue.
Generating templates and success stories for replication is likely to be
key to expanding these asset classes. The announcement in 2010 of the
Turkish government’s plan to build 25 health campuses using private finance
initiatives was soon followed by the selection of Istanbul as the venue for
the IFC’s 2013 biennial Global Private Health Conference, themed ‘Making
Global Connections: Leading Change in Emerging Health Markets’. The
Cameroon impact bond project explicitly draws inspiration from theAravind
healthcare chain in India (OPIC, 2017), which has been heavily touted for
a decade by development organizations as an inclusive and reproducible
commercial model for healthcare provision (IFC, 2014) and which indicates
the importance of longer-term marketing efforts in the financialization–
development nexus.
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RHETORICAL RECONSTRUCTION OF INVESTMENT MARKETS
The promotional apparatus that facilitates this new world view about what
population health requires, and brings it to governments, is considerable
and well-versed. Development finance institutions have worked alongside a
range of corporate and non-corporate actors to promote healthcare systems
as sites for generating returns on investment. The Big Four financial audi-
tors and Big Three management consultancies have produced many reports
that highlight market ‘opportunities’ in healthcare; for example, McKin-
sey published ‘Healthcare in China: Entering “Uncharted Waters”’ in 2012,
which was followed by KPMG’s ‘Commercial Opportunities in the Pri-
mary Care Market in China’ (KPMG, 2016a). Other reports present stories
of successful businesses to encourage investment and liberalization in the
sector. Deloitte produced the IFC’s 2014 ‘Landscape of Inclusive Business
Models of Healthcare in India’ report, and KPMG’s 2014 global healthcare
conference was followed by a report entitled ‘Staying Power: Success Sto-
ries in Global Healthcare’ (KPMG, 2016b). PricewaterhouseCoopers has
sponsored a series of case study reports on private finance initiatives in the
healthcare sector, including a review of projects in Latin America (Llumpo
et al., 2015).
Through these activities, healthcare systems in the global South are re-
imagined as marketplaces for investors to engage with. It is an activity that
development finance institutions have been keen to emphasize and reflects
the contemporary development trend inwhich entire sectors and countries are
labelled ‘emerging’ and ‘frontier’ markets to encourage investment (Four-
cade, 2013; IFC, 2017a; Mawdsley, 2018). These rhetorical devices enable
interested actors to construct a future of prosperity and investment growth
(Beckert, 2013; Thrift, 2001), and the value of financial products such as
shares in healthcare companies is driven by these imagined futures (Clark
et al., 2004).
In healthcare, the imagined future driving investment draws explicitly on
the growing burden of chronic diseases and the somewhat increased capacity
of the ‘middle classes’ to pay for healthcare. People facing a lifetime of
debilitating diseases are presented as resources to be exploited:
There has never been a more exciting time to be an investor in health in emerging markets.
Rising incomes in developing countries are propelling rapid growth of demand for health
goods and services, while disruptive technologies and innovation is [sic] creating new ways
of meeting this demand. Meanwhile, the growing prevalence of non-communicable diseases
like cancer, heart disease, and diabetes is upending perceptions of the needs for health in
developing countries. Developed and developing countries alike are struggling to cope with
the high cost of these diseases, in terms of lost lives, lost productivity, infrastructure financing,
and the human capital required to treat them.2
2. IFC Head for Health and Education in the inaugural issue of the organization’s healthcare
newsletter ‘PrivateHealthcare inEmergingMarkets:An Investor’s Perspective’ (IFC, 2015).
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The attractiveness of healthcare to commercial actors is similarly bluntly
presented in the business press. A South African fund management company
representative quoted in Bloomberg (McClelland, 2016), states: ‘The eco-
nomics behind AIDS and HIV can be lucrative because treatment requires
not only medicines but also nutritional requirements . . . there are oppor-
tunities through the value chain from wholesalers all the way to distribu-
tors’. Hospital managers, and an emerging corpus of ‘social entrepreneur’
physicians (Martin, 2014), often play a key role in legitimizing these con-
structions through their active support for investment and the infrastructure
expansion that comes with it, sometimes attracting significant personal sta-
tus and wealth in the process. Founders of hospital chains are described
by the business press as ‘visionary’ (IFC, 2011: 6; Kemperman et al.,
2016: 392), with frequent mention made of personal Entrepreneur of the
Year awards conferred by financial newspapers and the World Economic
Forum.
At the same time, individual citizens are invited to organize their daily
lives through active individual risk management, and engage with financial
markets through purchase of loans and insurance. Like microfinance loans,
health insurance packages have been marketed globally as a way to manage
the financial risks, in this case the risk of ill-health, with vocal support
for expansion of commercial insurance coming from the World Bank and
the private investment industry (Averill and Marriott, 2013; Birn et al.,
2016). These packages not only provide new flows for revenue extraction
by insurance companies and their investors, but also offer protection for
existing flows. For example, SKS Microfinance made its loans for low-
income clients in India conditional on the purchase of an SKS private health
insurance product (Banerjee et al., 2014). Financialization has created a
new subjectivity: the ‘investing subject’ — the ‘autonomous individual who
insures himself against the risks of the life cycle through financial literacy
and self-discipline’ (Aitken, 2007: 13, quoted in van der Zwan, 2014: 113).
THE CURIOUS BED-FELLOWS OF FINANCIALIZATION AND UNIVERSAL
HEALTH COVERAGE
The concept of ‘universal health coverage’ (UHC) is a recurring theme in
the documents that support private finance in the healthcare sector, just
as ‘financial inclusion’ features prominently in the extension of financial
services to low-income communities (Mader, 2018). In this scenario the
right to population health and its array of promotive, preventive, primary
and curative services becomes displaced by a much more restricted right
to healthcare ‘coverage’ (Birn et al., 2016; O’Laughlin, 2016; Qadeer and
Baru, 2016). And so, despite growing knowledge of the social, political and
commercial drivers of poor health, the SDG target to achieve universal health
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coverage by 2030 becomes widely interpreted as necessitating significant
expansion in healthcare infrastructure and insurance.
Dominant healthcare financing models in different countries may me-
diate the impact of financialization, and ‘universal health coverage’ is a
broad enough term to incorporate a range of publicly managed financing ar-
rangements, but is in practice characterized by concerted efforts to promote
models of healthcare financing based on ‘affordable’ user fees and health
insurance, and on expansion of privately owned healthcare infrastructure
(World Bank, 2016). Mexico’s voluntary health insurance system — Se-
guro Popular — has been held up as a role model for achieving universal
health coverage (Frenk et al., 2019) as it offers to finance basic healthcare
services for previously uninsured groups. However, by offering coverage
for a more limited set of healthcare services than other insurers, for example
excluding services for diabetes-related illness, Seguro Popular reinforces
social divisions in an already fragmented healthcare system (Birn et al.,
2016).
Until recently, development finance institutions had made the case for
equity investments and loans in the healthcare sector on the basis of job
creation (Hunter and Murray, 2015), but UHC is fast becoming a preferred
justification for their activities. The concept was invoked by the IFC in the
run-up to its 2017 Global Private Health Conference (IFC, 2017b), and by
CDC Group (2017). Commercial actors quickly saw the promotional bene-
fits: KPMG has established a Center for Universal Health Coverage; Abraaj
cited universal health coverage as necessitating its commercial investments
(Abraaj Group, 2017); and technology company Philips employs the concept
when promoting its investments and technology packages on development
media platform Devex (Devex and Philips, 2017). Such developments in-
dicate that the concept now occupies a central role in justifications for the
financialization of healthcare.
The shifting rhetoric around private capital and universal health cover-
age reflects the arrival of an implementation phase for the SDGs, where
aspirational goals are operationalized as policies with time-bound targets
and costed financing gaps (Stenberg et al., 2017). Like the Millennium
Development Goals before them, there is an impetus for quick gains us-
ing technologies that bypass systemic problems such as under-resourced
public healthcare systems and for portrayal of these systemic problems as
themselves requiring technical intervention (Storeng, 2014), usually incor-
porating contracts for commercial actors. Private investment in healthcare
provision and financing is now presented as the only solution for addressing
geographic gaps in healthcare provision, highmortality and catastrophic out-
of-pocket expenditures. As recently noted in a report produced by KPMG
and academic researchers on behalf of the World Innovation Summit for
Health, achieving universal health coverage by 2030 ‘is too ambitious to
be achieved without leveraging existing private capacity, investment and
innovation’ (Roland et al., 2018).
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SOCIETAL AND HEALTH EFFECTS OF ‘INVESTING IN HEALTH’
Davis and Kim’s (2015) review of the sociological literature makes a key
point that financialization not only represents a power shift from indus-
trial corporations to the financial sector but also a shift from social institu-
tions to markets as the dominant organizing principle. While the narrative
around healthcare investment seems to imply that investors, entrepreneurial
physicians and investing subjects work in the interests of population health
and healthcare systems, a private investment-fuelled expansion of these
healthcare provision models raises important questions about the decline
of healthcare systems as social institutions and the implications for eq-
uity. The expansion of privately financed projects is primarily a commer-
cial venture to which population health is a secondary, indeed sometimes
a contradictory, consideration. Increased access to diagnostics plus ever
more costly treatments have become the principal response to meet an epi-
demic of chronic illnesses that are fuelled by demographic and epidemio-
logical changes and by the dominance of commercial interests over health
concerns in the food, drink, transport, agriculture and manufacturing sec-
tors (Buse et al., 2017; Popkin et al., 2012; Swinburn et al., 2019; WHO,
2015).
The effects in the shorter term include health and financial risks, as well
as longer-term inequity and social segmentation. An emphasis on value
creation for investors encourages outsourcing (Davis and Kim, 2015) and
distorts healthcare provision to maximize profitability, undermining health,
increasing the drain on the public purse and depleting family resources.
Healthcare professionals in corporately owned hospitals, for example, face
overt and implicit incentives to increase revenue (Nundy et al., 2018) which
manifest in many settings with over-testing, over-diagnosis and unnecessary
treatments (Morgan et al., 2015). Unexpectedly high rates of CT/MRI scans,
caesarean section births, hysterectomies and cardiac surgeries appear to be
a growing problem in low- and middle-income countries (Brownlee et al.,
2017). Unjustified surgical procedures have particularly important negative
implications for health, including risk of subsequent infection, cardiovascu-
lar problems and death.
The financial burden of healthcare can either lead to additional costs for
governments who try to provide insurance cover, or can push service users
into outright poverty. Each year an estimated 100 million people are forced
below the US$ 1.90 a day poverty line by out-of-pocket healthcare expen-
diture (WHO and World Bank, 2017). In countries such as Bangladesh and
India, large out-of-pocket healthcare expenditures are disproportionately due
to costs of care in the private sector (Kanjilal et al., 2008; Rahman et al.,
2013), and yet many of the companies expanding with support from devel-
opment finance institutions, including the ‘bottom of the pyramid’ models,
are corporate enterprises offering fee-based care that must be purchased by
out-of-pocket payments or private health insurance.
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Perhaps the most significant meso-level change taking place now is the
drift towards acceptance and normalization of healthcare markets, com-
mercial imperatives and segmented healthcare systems. Population groups,
geographic areas and policy areas such as public health that are deemed
unprofitable can be neglected unless further public subsidies can be ob-
tained in the form of insurance programmes or public–private partnerships
(Bayliss and Van Waeyenberge, 2017). One motivator for governments to
pursue the infrastructure that will service segmented healthcare systems is
engagement with the global healthcare economy and related service sectors.
Turkey’s ‘health campus’ projects appear to be targeted as much at com-
peting for international medical travel as at meeting the needs of domestic
communities (Rosca, 2016). Similar state government initiatives in India
have incentivized large healthcare complexes (‘medicities’), some located
in special economic zones, to attract healthcare tourists (Murray et al., 2016).
Of particular concern is the way in which the segmented systems that are
being expanded reject single risk pools for healthcare and the redistribution
of wealth needed for social solidarity and equitable healthcare access (Mul-
ligan, 2016), undermining universalism in healthcare (Birn et al., 2016).
Recent research demonstrates the role of finance in shaping pharmaceutical
and private health insurance industries and their decision making. Burlage
and Anderson (2018) have described how private investment in pharmaceu-
tical industries is associated with a business strategy that eschews research
and development in favour of acquiring other companies (and their patents)
and gouging prices. Mulligan’s (2016) anthropological study of a health
insurance company in Puerto Rico shows how private health insurance is
characterized by shareholder value maximization strategies that are intro-
duced and driven by finance experts in the insurance companies. Companies
hide and offload costs while de-pooling and individualizing risk and respon-
sibility through segmented (risk-adjusted) pricing for premiums. The nature
of effects are industry specific, so similar pressures in the care sector have
manifested in the erosion of wages and employment conditions for frontline
workers who have limited access to collective organization for resistance
(Horton, 2017).
Segmented national healthcare systems are highly inequitable, and Chile
provides an example of how, despite achieving ‘coverage’ on healthcare
indicators, such system arrangements fail the poorer sections of society and
terminally undermine the quality of public provision. The Chilean military
government of the 1970s was one of the first to seek to reduce public spend-
ing and encourage market solutions by actively creating two parallel and
separately funded ‘sub-systems’ of healthcare provision in which the private
system primarily served the needs of the wealthy and healthy males with
salaries and incentivized private insurance plans. The over-stretched public
system was left to deal with the remaining majority of the population, and
with the complex problems of poverty and chronic disease, while struggling
to retain the specialist doctors that it trained, given the insufficient invest-
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ment, long waiting lists and heavy workloads. The private sector has been
quick to exploit the newmarket opportunities. Private hospital infrastructure
has multiplied in urban areas as public funds are rerouted to purchase (with
user co-payments) its packages of care in selected profitable areas with high
bed occupancy and rapid throughput such as maternity care. It is a cycle that
fuels healthcare industry expansion, perpetuates specialist flight, deprives
the public sector further of funds, and jeopardizes the quality of care in rural
and poor urban areas (Murray and Elston, 2005; Rotarou and Sakellariou,
2017; Siebert, 2015). Countries now pursuing private investment-fuelled
infrastructure expansion are likely to experience similar trajectories.
Meanwhile trends towards greater concentration of ownership in the
healthcare provision sector suggest a growing public reliance on the re-
sources of a small number of corporately owned chains that are driven by
shareholder concern with dividends and company value, with serious long-
term implications for costs and regulation. Healthcare companies are pursu-
ing acquisitions and fast rates of growth in the number of facilities to increase
company value. In Turkey this has led to rapid expansion and concentration
in the private healthcare sector (Eren Vural, 2017), and other commentators
have pointed to similar trends for concentration in India (Chakravarthi et al.,
2017) and South Africa (Munyai, 2018)— countries that have been the focus
of ‘leveraging’ efforts by development finance institutions. The search for
new markets has also encouraged transnational activity, and middle-income
countries in Eastern and Western Africa are attracting particular attention
(Mohandas, 2016). Little notice is being taken of the ways in which expan-
sion and consolidation by these companies is ‘locking in’ particular models
for healthcare provision and financing. The influence of these chains in do-
mestic politics makes it a trend that is difficult to reverse (Dreze and Sen,
2013: Ch. 6).
The use of private finance initiatives to expand public healthcare infra-
structure offers little consolation given their relatively high cost to the public
purse compared to other forms of financing (Bayliss and Van Waeyenberge,
2017); moreover, long-term escalation of costs has been documented in a
rapidly growing body of literature from the global North (Pollock, 2005;
Whiteside, 2015) and the global South (Webster, 2015). Increasingly, public
organizations in those countries are trying to extricate themselves from
private finance initiatives, with mixed success (Davis et al., 2015), and a
global coalition of non-governmental organizations has called on the World
Bank and other development organizations to stop promoting such models
(Eurodad, 2017).
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Other scholars have interrogated the recent history of capital relations in
healthcare (for example, O’Laughlin, 2016). Our analysis advances this by
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charting the contours of an emerging financialized phase. In this article we
offer a deconstruction of financialization in healthcare that enables us to see
current developments situated within wider patterns of capital formation.
We highlight the antecedents, institutions, instruments and ideas that facil-
itate the process and we argue that the transformation of healthcare into a
set of saleable and tradeable assets has built on four decades of healthcare
commercialization that has deregulated activities to enable profitable invest-
ment and provision. This latest phase is characterized by a ‘common-sense’
policy position amongst many governments and bilateral and multilateral
development agencies that enormous volumes of private financial capital
are necessary for promoting development in the healthcare sphere, and by
the development of new asset classes. Closer scrutiny reveals alliances of
domestic and transnational private capital using highly selective representa-
tions of ‘development’ to favour healthcare models that permit the extraction
of revenue from situations of vulnerability.
As a consequence, healthcare markets are being formed with little regard
for effects on health and equity. Corporate provision of healthcare, for ex-
ample, is promoted as offering high quality and affordable care as either a
transitional or permanent contributor to the achievement of universal health
coverage. Yet there are important reasons to be sceptical about this narrative
and the effects of a corporate-oriented transformation in healthcare systems.
The proposed infrastructure expansion and the focus on profitable treatment
of illnesses or related diagnostic services has inherent problems that stem
from the need to generate revenue or capital growth for the benefit of in-
vestors. Similarly, problems arise from the roll-out of insurance models that
rely on unbundling of risk, or that aim to generate profit from government
commitments to provide in-patient care. Many provide regular income for
the private healthcare sector and aid the penetration of the insurance industry
in the health sector, and they contribute to locking-in models of healthcare
that undermine social solidarity and redistribution of wealth, and that di-
vert public funds from more progressive health promotion activities such as
public health interventions.
The euphoria of the buzz, and buzzwords, of financialization have begun
to permeate some potential sites where critique and resistance might have
been anticipated, and private investment in healthcare is fast becoming an
unquestioned policy in global health. Organizers of a leading biennial global
health systems conference — the Global Symposium on Health Systems
Research — chose to set up the differing views on private sector engage-
ment for provision and financing as a conflict between ‘pragmatism’ and
‘polemic’, thus offering little invitation to critical analyses (Health Systems
Global, 2018). Public health and higher education institutions, themselves
now subject to the same financial imperatives which circulate in healthcare
provision, have embraced new opportunities to be contracted by investor
groups to conduct research that will support the fine-tuning of investment
activities and bolster their gravitas and feel-good image. The commissioning
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of a prestigious academic research group by CDC Group to help produce an
evaluation template for their healthcare investments reflects a recent trend
for public health academics to conduct market-related research for spin-off
third-party ‘initiatives’ funded by commercial interests that might otherwise
be performed by commercial consultancy agencies.
However, organized resistance has also emerged, in particular from civil
society alliances. Analyses, lobbying and campaigns by the People’s Health
Movement et al. (2017), the global trade union federation Public Services
International (Lethbridge, 2016) and Oxfam (Averill and Marriott, 2013;
Oxfam, 2014) figure among these. Such alliances also connect to networks
of non-governmental organizations and academics concerned by a private
turn in development finance (Eurodad, 2017; Gabor et al., 2018). In some
settings healthcare professional associations have attempted to stall reforms
that permit commercialization and financial capital-fuelled private health-
care expansions (Iriart, 2005; Yilmaz, 2017); in others, groups of profes-
sionals are organizing through national and international networks such as
the Community of Practitioners on Accountability and Social Action in
Health (COPASAH). In a few cases in Latin America, such as Bolivia and
El Salvador, national governments have also acted to overcome industry
opposition to introduce legislation that rolls back commercialization and
expands healthcare entitlements (People’s Health Movement et al., 2014).
Inspiration for further scholarly contribution can be drawn from the bur-
geoning body of social science studies on financialization (Bayliss et al.,
2017; Davis and Kim, 2015; Storm, 2018), and we see opportunities for
interdisciplinary research to generate critical insights through detailed anal-
ysis of processes for identifying investment targets and engaging investors.
Processes of financialization have permeated social reproductionworldwide,
driving public policy and providing lucrative returns for finance capital. It is
clear that the current shift towards private finance in development risks di-
verting attention away from core principles of equity and social justice, away
from the possibilities for creating decommodified zones in social reproduc-
tion, and towards profitable projects and greater inequality. Research that
further examines the actors, processes and effects of the financialization–
development nexus will be key to unravelling the pervasiveness of the nar-
rative of private finance solutions to public problems.
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